Persistent Real Exchange Rates by Alok Johri & Amartya Lahiri
  
  
  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
  
  
  
2008-04 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
McMASTER UNIVERSITY 
Department of Economics 
Kenneth Taylor Hall 426 
1280 Main Street West 
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada 
L8S 4M4 
http://www.mcmaster.ca/economics/Persistent Real Exchange Rates1
Alok Johri
Department of Economics,
McMaster University,
1280 Main Street West,
Hamilton, ON, Canada L8S 4M4
Amartya Lahiri 2
Department of Economics,
University of British Columbia,
997-1873 East Mall,
Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z1
June 17, 2008
1We would like to thank without implicating two anonymous referees, the editor Eric van Wincoop,
Paul Beaudry, Mick Devereux, Marc-Andre Letendre, Rajesh Singh and participants at the Kobe-UBC-SFU
macro conference, FRBNY, York University, 2006 SED meetings and the 2007 Midwest Macro meetings for
helpful comments. Daqing Luo provided excellent research assistance. Both authors would like to thank
SSHRC for grants which facilitated this research.
2Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 604 822 8606; fax: +1 604 822 5915 E-mail addresses:
johria@mcmail.cis.mcmaster.ca (A. Johri), alahiri@interchange.ubc.ca (A. Lahiri)Abstract
Three well known facts that characterize exchange rate data are: (a) the high correlation between
bilateral nominal and real exchange rates; (b) the high degree of persistence in real exchange rate
movements; and (c) the high volatility of real exchange rates. This paper attempts a joint, albeit
partial, rationalization of these facts in an environment with no staggered contracts and where
prices are preset for only one quarter. There are two key innovations in the paper. First, we
augment a standard two-country open economy model with learning-by-doing in production at the
￿rm level. This induces monopolistically competitive ￿rms to endogeneize the productivity e⁄ect
of their price setting behavior. Speci￿cally, ￿rms endogenously choose not to adjust prices by the
full proportion of a positive monetary shock in order to take advantage of the productivity bene￿ts
of higher production. Second, we introduce habits in leisure. This makes the labor supply decision
dynamic and adds an additional source of propagation. We show that the calibrated model can
quantitatively reproduce signi￿cant fractions of the aforementioned facts. Moreover, as in the
data, the model also produces a positive correlation between the terms of trade and the nominal
exchange rate.
Keywords: Real exchange rate movements, endogenous price stickiness, learning-by-doing
JEL Classification: F1, F21 Introduction
Three well known facts that characterize exchange rate data are: (a) the high correlation between
bilateral nominal and real exchange rates; (b) the high degree of persistence in real exchange
rate movements; and (c) the high volatility of real exchange rates. These facts have proved to
be non-trivial challenges for standard open economy dynamic general equilibrium models. The
conventional approach to explaining these facts has been to assume sticky prices and/or staggered
contracts. However, recent work by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) has called this approach
into question. They show that in order for sticky prices and staggered contracts to account for
a signi￿cant fraction of the dynamics of exchange rates, prices must be ￿xed for at least one
year. Recent evidence in Bils and Klenow (2004) seriously calls into question such long-lived price
stickiness.1
In this paper we modify a standard two-country open economy model along two dimensions.
First, we follow the work of Cooper and Johri (2002) and introduce a ￿rm-level learning-by-doing
e⁄ect into the production technology. In particular, higher production in any period by a ￿rm
leads to the accumulation of organizational capital by the ￿rm. This causes increases not only in
productivity in the next period but also in the stock of organizational capital in future periods.
This feature makes the pricing decision of monopolistically competitive ￿rms dynamic with ￿rms
endogeneizing the e⁄ect of their pricing decision today on productivity tomorrow. Hence, faced
with a nominal shock ￿rms voluntarily choose not to adjust their prices fully even when they are
free to do so. This generates endogenous price stickiness thereby lowering the degree of exogenous
stickiness that is required to match the data. Second, we introduce habit persistence in leisure.
By making the household￿ s labor supply decision dynamic, this feature generates an additional
mechanism for the endogenous propagation of shocks.
In an environment where prices are preset for just one quarter and there is no staggered price
1Bils and Klenow (2004) ￿nd that half of all posted prices last less than 4.3 months. Moreover, relative to the
predictions of the standard sticky price models, they ￿nd that actual in￿ ation displays far more volatility and less
persistence even for goods which display high price stickiness.
1setting, we quantitatively evaluate the response of the model economy to estimated money shocks.
We ￿nd that the net impact of our two key innovations on the dynamics of real exchange rates
is substantial. In their absence, real exchange rates would display essentially no auto-correlation.
For our baseline parameterization, the ￿rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the simulated real
exchange rate series is 0:80 while the standard deviation of the real exchange rate relative to
output is 5:67. The data counterparts of these two numbers are 0:94 and 5:5. The model can also
quantitatively reproduce the observed correlation between the nominal and real exchange rates.2
Lastly, the model produces a positive, contemporaneous correlation of 0:24 between the nominal
exchange rate and the terms of trade which is consistent with data. As pointed out by Obstfeld
and Rogo⁄ (2000), most of the standard sticky price models are unable to produce this positive
correlation.
We ￿nd these results interesting on two counts. First, our results are supportive of the two key
modi￿cations that we introduced in this paper ￿learning-by-doing and habits ￿for understanding
real exchange rate movements. Second, we believe that our results demonstrate that long-lived
sticky prices are not necessary to explain persistent real exchange rate movements since all our
results are derived in an environment with only one-period preset prices.
While most of the elements in the model are standard, the idea behind the introduction of the
two main additional features ￿learning-by-doing (LBD) and habit persistence in leisure ￿require a
little elaboration. Consider a one-time permanent increase in money supply in the standard model
without LBD and habit persistence. The standard model has the property that a nominal shock
raises nominal demand for goods. If price-setting monopolistically competitive ￿rms were free to
reset their prices then they would raise their price to the point that real demand for their goods
remains at the pro￿t maximizing level of output. Hence, persistence of a nominal shock on real
variables is linked to the length for which ￿rms are unable to adjust prices.
How does the introduction of LBD alter the logic above? LBD makes the pricing decision of the
2We follow Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and use their data on the USA and a European aggregate entity
as the two countries for constructing the relevant moments in the data for our two country model.
2￿rm dynamic. At each point in time, a ￿rm that is choosing prices trades o⁄ the positive revenue
e⁄ect of a higher price with the negative future productivity e⁄ect of lower learning today due to
lower production. Hence, the optimal price, ceteris paribus, is lower than in the standard model.
Moreover, this e⁄ect introduces an endogenous source of propagation of shocks. A higher output
today implies a greater stock of organizational knowledge tomorrow (due to learning). This directly
reduces the marginal cost of production tomorrow and hence, induces the ￿rm to raise prices by
less than they would otherwise. Crucially, this e⁄ect always operates independent of whether the
learning e⁄ect is internal or external to the ￿rm.
If the LBD e⁄ect is endogeneized by the ￿rm then there is a second reason for sluggish price ad-
justment. In particular, a higher output today raises the stock of organizational capital tomorrow.
Current output and current organizational capital stock are complementary inputs in producing
future organizational capital. Hence, in the period after the shock when the ￿rm is free to reset
prices, it realizes that the higher current stock of organizational capital implies the marginal learn-
ing from an extra unit of output today is higher than in steady state. Put di⁄erently, learning
is cheaper. At the margin, this induces the ￿rm to raise prices less than it would otherwise in
order to take advantage of the cheaper learning environment. Thus, a one-time permanent increase
in money supply in a model with LBD would raise prices but only gradually toward its long run
steady state level. The process eventually dies out due to decreasing returns to scale in the learning
function. In the new steady state prices would have adjusted by the full proportion of the shock.
What role do habits play in propagating nominal shocks? A typical feature of models with
sticky prices is that output is demand determined. Hence, when ￿rms are unable to adjust their
price they increase their production by primarily increasing labor employed. Once ￿rms are free
to adjust prices output declines back to its steady state level with the adjustment coming through
a fall in employment. Habits in leisure make the labor supply decision of households dynamic. At
an optimum the household balances the marginal utility gain of an extra unit of leisure today with
not just the foregone wage but also the reduced marginal utility from an additional unit of leisure
tomorrow due to the higher stock of habits. Hence, households adjust their labor supply slowly
3over time which makes the output dynamics gradual in response to a shock. The ￿ ip side of this
is that real wages adjust slowly which implies that prices which clear the goods market also adjust
sluggishly relative to the standard model. This causes the real e⁄ects of nominal shocks to persist
longer.
The intuition above suggests that the introduction of either learning or habits, by themselves,
should increase the degree of persistence in the standard model. Indeed it does. Our quantitative
results show that individually both LBD and habits raise the degree of persistence of real exchange
rates relative to the standard model. However, neither e⁄ect is individually large enough to raise
the persistence of real exchange rates close to the observed level in the data. When we introduce
both e⁄ects simultaneously however, the persistence generated by the model rises signi￿cantly
with the ￿rst-order autoregression coe¢ cient of the real exchange rate in the model being 0:80
which is quite close to the 0:94 coe¢ cient in the data. LBD and habits contribute roughly equal
amounts to the overall degree of persistence generated by the model. Thus, to generate the correct
quantitative magnitudes for the real exchange rate dynamics we need both learning and habits to
operate simultaneously.
Our work is related to a large body of existing work on explaining real exchange rate ￿ uctuations
using models with sticky prices and monetary shocks. This literature goes back to Dornbusch
(1976) but its modern general equilibrium version starts with Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995). Our
work is probably closest in spirit to the papers by Betts and Devereaux (2000) and Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2002), both of which study models with monopolistic competition but introduce
local currency pricing by exporting ￿rms.3
A related literature has focussed on explaining deviations from purchasing power parity by
using "pricing to market" arguments. This view formalizes the idea that producers can price
discriminate across markets. Hence, price variations across countries arise due to di⁄erent degrees
3This is in contrast to the producer currency pricing environment studied in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995) where
there is 100 percent exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices as purchasing power parity holds at all times on
traded goods.
4of market power (see Dornbusch, 1987). To get real exchange rates to be volatile and persistent this
set-up can be augmented with distribution costs for traded goods with the distribution sector using
non-traded resources. Formalizations of these arguments can be found in Burstein, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2005), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000) and Ravn and Mazzenga (2004) amongst others.
We abstract from these distribution cost margins but show how the LBD margin introduced in this
paper plays a similar role. Our work is also related to Bergin and Feenstra (2001) and Bouakez
(2005) who consider more general demand functions than the constant elasticity case which allows
for variable markups. Our model also generates ￿ uctuating markups but not due to di⁄erent
demand functions. instead markups ￿ uctuate due to the endogenous productivity e⁄ects induced
by learning.
We also build on existing work on learning-by-doing (LBD) models by di⁄erent authors. While
learning-by-doing is often associated with workers and modeled as the accumulation of human
capital, a number of economists have argued that ￿rms are also store-houses of knowledge. Atkeson
and Kehoe (2005) note ￿At least as far back as Marshall (1930, bk.iv, chap. 13.I), economists
have argued that organizations store and accumulate knowledge that a⁄ects their technology of
production. This accumulated knowledge is a type of unmeasured capital distinct from the concepts
of physical or human capital in the standard growth model." Similarly Lev and Radharkrishnan
(2003) write, ￿Organization capital is thus an agglomeration of technologies￿ business practices,
processes and designs, including incentive and compensation systems￿ that enable some ￿rms to
consistently extract out of a given level of resources a higher level of product and at lower cost than
other ￿rms."4
Our speci￿cation of how learning-by-doing leads to productivity increases draws on early work
4There are at least two ways to think about what constitutes organizational capital. Some, like Rosen (1972),
think of it as a ￿rm speci￿c capital good while others focus on speci￿c knowledge embodied in the matches between
workers and tasks within the ￿rm. While these di⁄erences are important, especially when trying to measure the
payments associated with various inputs, they are not crucial to the issues at hand. As a result we do not distinguish
between the two.
5by Arrow (1962) and Rosen (1972) as well as a large empirical literature dating back roughly
a hundred years. This literature documents the pervasive presence of learning e⁄ects in virtually
every area of the economy. Recent studies include Bahk and Gort (1993), Irwin and Klenow (1994),
Jarmin (1994), Benkard (2000), Thornton and Thompson (2001), Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide
(2002) and Cooper and Johri (2002). The current speci￿cation is taken from Cooper and Johri
(2002) which not only o⁄ers a detailed justi￿cation for the modeling assumptions but also a number
of estimates of the learning technology at di⁄erent levels of aggregation for the US economy.
The literature on habits in leisure goes back to Kydland and Prescott (1982). This body of
work was motivated by the insight that in order to explain the volatility of labor hours time non-
separability in leisure may be key. Numerous papers since have tried to estimate the size of habits
on leisure and/or used them to explain the dynamic behavior of hours worked. A non-exhaustive
list of these contributions are Hotz et al (1988), Eichenbaum et al (1988), Yun (1996) and Bouakez
and Kano (2006). Our paper builds on this body of research.
The next section presents and develops the model while in Section 3 we describe the solution
method and the calibration of the model. Section 4 compares the simulation results with the data
and o⁄ers sensitivity tests while the last section contains concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a standard two-country open economy model as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002)
(CKM henceforth). We call the countries home and foreign. Each country is characterized by
households, ￿nal goods ￿rms, and intermediate goods ￿rms. Intermediate goods are traded across
countries while the ￿nal good is a non-tradable which is both a consumption and capital good. We
assume that the state space is ￿nite so that in each period one of a ￿nitely many events may occur.
We denote the history of events through time t by st = (s0;s1;:::;st) with an associated probability
￿(st). Note that si is a speci￿c state which includes policy shocks. Throughout the paper we
shall adopt the notational convention of denoting foreign country variables with an asterisk.
62.1 Households
We assume that asset markets are complete so that households can trade in state-contingent se-
curities which span all possible states. Households in the home country can buy state contingent
nominal bonds B(st+1) which pay one unit of the domestic currency in state st+1 and zero oth-
erwise. Foreign households￿holdings of these nominal one period bonds are denominated by B￿.
The price of these bonds are given by Q(st+1￿
￿st). In any period t households face the budget
constraint
P(st)c(st) + M(st) ￿ M(st￿1) +
X
st+1
Q(st+1￿
￿st)B(st+1) + P(st)x(st) (1)
￿P(st)
￿
w(st)N(st) + R(st)K(st￿1)
￿
+ B(st) + ￿(st) + T(st);
where M denotes nominal money balances, P is the price level, w is the wage rate, N is labor
supply, K is the capital stock, x is investment, R is the rental rate for capital, ￿ are pro￿ts of
intermediate goods producers, and T are lump sum transfers. We assume that the economy faces
quadratic costs of adjusting the capital stock. In particular, the capital stock evolves according to
K(st) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K
￿
st￿1￿
= x(st) ￿
v
2
￿
x(st)
K(st￿1)
￿ ￿
￿2
K(st￿1) (2)
We should note that these adjustment costs are a real resource cost for the economy. However,
since investment just equals depreciation in steady state, the particular form for the adjustment
cost function assumed here guarantees that no adjustment costs are incurred in steady state.
Households in both countries derive utility from consumption, leisure and real money balances.
Thus, households in the home country choose c; l;B;x and M to maximize their lifetime utility
given by
1 X
t=0
X
st
￿t￿(st)U
￿
c(st);l(st) ￿ bl(st￿1);
M(st)
P(st)
￿
; (3)
where ￿ denotes the discount factor. Note that the preference speci￿cation above allows for
endogenous habit formation with the b ￿ 0 being the parameter which determines the degree of
habit persistence. These preferences reduce to the standard speci￿cation with no habits for b = 0.
7Households are endowed with one unit of time which they can either use for leisure l or work N.
Hence, N + l = 1 at all dates and states. The ￿rst-order conditions for optimality are given by
Ul(st)
Uc(st)
=w(st) + b
X
st+1
Q(st+1￿
￿st)
P(st+1)
P(st)
Ul(st+1)
Uc(st+1)
(4)
Um(st)
P(st)
￿
Uc(st)
P(st)
=￿￿
X
st+1
￿(st+1￿
￿st)
Uc(st+1)
P(st+1)
(5)
Q(st+1￿ ￿st)=￿￿(st+1￿ ￿st)
Uc(st+1)
Uc(st)
P(st)
P(st+1)
(6)
Uc(st)
1 ￿ v
￿
x(st)
K(st￿1) ￿ ￿
￿ =￿
X
st+1
￿(st+1￿
￿st)
2
4 Uc(st+1)
1 ￿ v
￿
x(st+1)
K(st) ￿ ￿
￿
3
5D(st+1) (7)
where Uj(si) denotes the derivative of U with respect to variable j evaluated in state si. Note that
D(st+1) = R(st+1)
￿
1 ￿ v
￿
x(st+1)
K(st)
￿ ￿
￿￿
+ 1 ￿ ￿ +
v
2
"￿
x(st+1)
K(st)
￿2
￿ ￿2
#
These ￿rst order conditions are standard. Equation (4) is the optimal labor-leisure choice. It
is standard except for the second term on the right hand side which re￿ ects the role of habits.
In particular, an extra unit of leisure generates some positive current marginal utility but it also
raises the stock of habits tomorrow. This second e⁄ect reduces the marginal utility of leisure
tomorrow and hence is an additional cost (over and above the foregone wage) to current leisure.
(5) is the optimality condition determining money demand while equation (6) is the equation
which determines optimal bond holdings. Lastly, equation (7) is the optimality condition for
capital accumulation. This condition looks slightly di⁄erent from the standard intertemporal euler
equation due to the presence of adjustment costs. Since v ￿ 0, at the optimum, the household
endogeneizes the fact that one unit of foregone consumption today produces only 1￿v
￿
x(st)
K(st￿1) ￿ ￿
￿
units of capital tomorrow. Also, note that ￿(st+1￿
￿st) = ￿(st+1)=￿(st) is the probability of state
st+1 conditional on state st having been realized.
8The preceding set of ￿rst order conditions imply two no-arbitrage conditions:
Um(st)
Uc(st)
=1 ￿
X
st+1
Q(st+1￿
￿st)
P(st)
1 ￿ v
￿
x(st)
K(st￿1) ￿ ￿
￿ =
X
st+1
Q(st+1￿ ￿st)
P(st+1)D(st+1)
1 ￿ v
￿
x(st+1)
K(st) ￿ ￿
￿
The ￿rst is the no-arbitrage relationship between saving in money balances and in nominal state
contingent bonds. Note that
P
st+1 Q(st+1￿ ￿st) is the total expenditure on nominal bonds that
is required for a guaranteed delivery of one unit of the domestic currency in state st+1. Hence,
this de￿nes the nominal interest rate. The second equation is the no-arbitrage relation between
bonds and capital. P(st) is the nominal cost of one unit of foregone consumption which produces 1￿
v
￿
x(st)
K(st￿1) ￿ ￿
￿
units of capital. This accumulated capital delivers P(st+1)D(st+1)=
h
1 ￿ v
￿
x(st+1)
K(st) ￿ ￿
￿i
units of the domestic currency in st+1 since the accumulated capital today also reduces the ad-
justment cost required for capital accumulation tomorrow The purchase price of a bond which
delivers of one unit of the local currency in state st+1 is Q(st+1￿ ￿st). The right hand side of the
second equation thus gives the future bene￿t of foregoing one unit of consumption today evaluated
through bond prices.
The foreign households face a symmetric problem to the domestic household. Their periodic
budget constraint is given by
P￿(st)c￿(st) + M￿(st) ￿ M￿(st￿1) +
X
st+1
Q(st+1￿
￿st)
B￿(st+1)
e(st)
+ P￿(st)x￿(st) (8)
￿P￿(st)
￿
w￿(st)l￿(st) + R￿(st)K￿(st￿1)
￿
+
B￿(st)
e(st)
+ ￿￿(st) + T￿(st);
where e denotes the domestic currency price of one unit of the foreign currency, i.e., it is the nominal
exchange rate. Moreover, capital accumulation in the foreign country is given by
K￿(st) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K￿ ￿
st￿1￿
= x￿(st) ￿
v
2
￿
x￿(st)
K￿(st￿1)
￿ ￿
￿2
K￿(st￿1): (9)
Note that we are assuming that the technology governing adjustment costs is identical in both
countries, i.e., they both face the same adjustment cost parameter v.
9This problem leads to three analogous ￿rst order conditions. The ￿rst order conditions for
the labor-leisure, money balances and capital accumulation are exactly symmetric to the domestic
household. The optimal bond holdings equation for the foreign household is given by
Q(st+1￿ ￿st) = ￿￿(st+1￿ ￿st)
U￿
c (st+1)
U￿
c (st)
P￿(st)e(st)
P￿(st+1)e(st+1)
Equating the state contingent bond prices for home and foreign households gives
q(st+1)
q(st)
=
U￿
c (st+1)=Uc(st+1)
U￿
c (st)=Uc(st)
:
where we have de￿ned the real exchange rate as q = eP￿
P . Iterating on this equation yields the
expression
q(st) = ￿
U￿
c (st)
Uc(st)
; (10)
where ￿ =
Uc(s0)
U￿
c (s0)
e(s0)P￿(s0)
P(s0) . Equation (10) makes clear that the real exchange rate in this economy
is just given by the ratio of marginal utilities between home and abroad.
Due to the complete asset markets environment our model generates the consumption correla-
tion puzzle. As is obvious from equation (10) the correlation between relative consumption and the
real exchange rate is going to be too high (it equals unity in the case where preferences are separable
across the three arguments) when compared with the data. This is a standard problem in models
with complete asset markets and our￿ s is no exception. Recent work by Corsetti et al (2006) who
introduce distribution costs and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2006) who relax the assumption of
perfect risk sharing within countries have both tried to address this issue.
2.2 Final goods ￿rms
In both countries ￿nal goods are produced using a continuum of domestic and foreign intermediate
goods which are indexed by i 2 [0;1]. The production technologies for the ￿nal goods sector are
given by
y(st)=
"
a1
￿Z 1
0
yh(i;st)￿di
￿ ￿
￿
+ a2
￿Z 1
0
yf(i;st)￿di
￿ ￿
￿
#1=￿
; (11)
y￿(st)=
"
a1
￿Z 1
0
y￿
f(i;st)￿di
￿ ￿
￿
+ a2
￿Z 1
0
y￿
h(i;st)￿di
￿ ￿
￿
#1=￿
: (12)
10Thus, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign intermediate goods is 1=(1￿￿) while
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods produced in the same location is 1=(1￿￿).5
The ￿nal goods sector is assumed to be competitive in both countries. Thus, ￿nal goods ￿rms
in the home country choose yh(i;st) and yf(i;st) to maximize
P(st)y(st) ￿
Z 1
0
Ph(i;st￿1)yh(i;st)di ￿
Z 1
0
Pf(i;st￿1)yf(i;st)di
subject to equation (11). Ph(i;st￿1) is the price of the home intermediate good i while Pf(i;st￿1) is
home currency price of the foreign intermediate good i. Note that these expressions re￿ ect the fact
that intermediate goods producers set prices for period t before observing st. Hence, intermediate
goods prices are preset one period in advance. Also, intermediate goods producers set their prices
in the currency of the country where they sell. This set up assumes local currency pricing as well
as pricing to market (see Betts and Devereaux (2000)).
The solution to this problem leads to the following input demand functions:
yh(i;st)=
￿
a1P(st)
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿ Ph(st￿1)
￿￿￿
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
Ph(i;st￿1)1=(1￿￿) y(st); (13)
yf(i;st)=
￿
a2P(st)
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿ Pf(st￿1)
￿￿￿
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
Pf(i;st￿1)1=(1￿￿) y(st); (14)
where ￿ Pj(st￿1) =
￿R 1
0
￿
Pj(i;st￿1)
￿ ￿
￿￿1 di
￿ ￿￿1
￿
for j = h;f. Moreover, the zero pro￿t condition for
￿nal goods ￿rms implies that the price of the ￿nal good in the home country is given by
P(st) =
￿
a
1
1￿￿
1 ￿ Ph(st￿1)
￿
￿￿1 + a
1
1￿￿
2 ￿ Pf(st￿1)
￿
￿￿1
￿ ￿￿1
￿
: (15)
An analogous problem for foreign ￿nal goods producers implies two additional input demand
equations and an equation determining the foreign currency price of the ￿nal good in the foreign
5Our notational convention for intermediate goods is that the subscript denotes origin of the good while the
superscript denotes the destination of the good. Hence, y
￿
h denotes the home intermediate good sold in the foreign
country while yh denotes the home intermediate good sold at home. The foreign intermediates follow similarly.
11country:
y￿
f(i;st)=
￿
a1P￿(st)
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿ P￿
f (st￿1)
￿￿￿
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
P￿
f (i;st￿1)1=(1￿￿) y￿(st) (16)
y￿
h(i;st)=
￿
a2P￿(st)
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿ P￿
h(st￿1)
￿￿￿
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
P￿
h(i;st￿1)1=(1￿￿) y￿(st) (17)
P￿(st)=
￿
a
1
1￿￿
1 ￿ P￿
f (st￿1)
￿
￿￿1 + a
1
1￿￿
2 ￿ P￿
h(st￿1)
￿
￿￿1
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(18)
2.3 Intermediate goods ￿rms
As is standard in this class of models, monopolistically competitive ￿rms solve a two stage problem.
In stage 1 they choose their factor inputs optimally to produce a given output of the good. In
stage 2, they choose prices to maximize pro￿ts subject to the demand functions they face for their
product taking as given the optimal cost function derived in stage 1. Home intermediate goods
￿rms produce goods for both the home ￿nal goods sector as well as for the foreign ￿nal goods
sector.
The production technology facing intermediate goods ￿rm i at home is
y(i;st) ￿ yh(i;st) + y￿
h(i;st) = F
￿
K(i;st￿1);N(i;st);H(i;st￿1)
￿
;
where H is the stock of organizational capital of the ￿rm. More speci￿cally, we shall assume that
the production technology is given by
F
￿
K(i;st￿1);N(i;st);H(i;st￿1)
￿
= N(i;st)￿K(i;st￿1)￿H(i;st￿1)"
Capital and labor are rented in competitive factor markets. The presence of organizational capital
in the production technology of intermediate goods is one of the two key innovations in this paper
relative to CKM (2002). We follow Cooper and Johri (2002) and assume that the evolution of ￿rm
speci￿c organizational capital is given by
H(i;st) = H(i;st￿1)￿y(i;st)￿: (19)
Thus, an intermediate goods ￿rm￿ s output depends positively on its output yesterday due to the
link through the stock of organizational capital.
122.3.1 Stage I problem: Cost minimization
In Stage I domestic intermediate goods ￿rm i chooses labor and capital inputs to minimize cost
given a level of demand. Thus, this ￿rm minimizes
C(i;st) = P(st)
￿
w(st)N(i;st) + R(st)K(i;st￿1)
￿
subject to N(i;st)￿K(i;st￿1)￿H(i;st)" ￿ y(i;st). The ￿rst order condition for this problem is the
familiar relation
w(st)
R(st)
=
￿
￿
K(i;st￿1)
N(i;st)
for all i
Thus, the optimal capital-labor ratio is identical across all ￿rms. Substituting this back into the
cost function gives the optimized costs to be
~ C(i;st) = P(st)B
￿
w(st)￿R(st)￿ y(i;st)
H(i;st￿1)"
￿ 1
￿+￿
(20)
where B =
￿
￿+￿
￿
￿￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿+￿. In deriving ~ C we have also used the production function for inter-
mediate goods. Note that when ￿ + ￿ = 1, the minimized cost function is linear in output. For
later reference, it is useful at this stage to note that ~ C is decreasing in H. Hence, a bigger stock of
organizational capital reduces operating costs for the ￿rm. Lastly, an analogous expression holds
for foreign intermediate goods ￿rms, i.e.,
~ C￿(i;st) = P￿(st)B
￿
w￿(st)￿R￿(st)￿ y￿(i;st)
H￿(i;st￿1)"
￿ 1
￿+￿
(21)
where y￿(i;st) ￿ yf(i;st) + y￿
f(i;st).
2.3.2 Stage II problem
In stage II the intermediate goods ￿rms jointly choose organizational capital for tomorrow, H(i;st)
and the nominal prices that they post for the period, Ph and P￿
h. Note that these prices are in
the local currency of the market where they are selling. Crucially, at time t ￿rms post these prices
before observing the monetary shocks for this period. Thus, the posted prices for time t are based
only on information contained in the history st￿1.
13Each domestic ￿rm maximizes the present discounted value of pro￿ts given by
X
t
X
st
Q(st)￿(i;st) =
X
t
X
st
Q(st)
h
Ph(i;st￿1)yh(i;st) + e(st)P￿
h(i;st￿1)y￿
h(i;st) ￿ ~ C(i;st)
i
:
The maximization is subject to the constraints imposed by equations (13), (17), (19) and (20).
Note that Q(st) = Q(st￿1)Q(st￿
￿st￿1). The ￿rst order conditions for ￿rm optimality once suitably
rearranged yield
Ph(i;st￿1)=
P
st Q(st)yh(i;st)
￿
mc(i;st) ￿ ￿￿(i;st)H(i;st￿1)￿y(i;st)￿￿1￿
￿
P
st Q(st)yh(i;st)
; (22)
P￿
h(i;st￿1)=
P
st Q(st)y￿
h(i;st)
￿
mc(i;st) ￿ ￿￿(i;st)H(i;st￿1)￿y(i;st)￿￿1￿
￿
P
st Q(st)e(st)y￿
h(i;st)
; (23)
￿(i;st)=
X
st+1
Q(st+1)
(￿
"
￿ + ￿
￿ ~ C(i;st+1)
H(i;st)
+ ￿￿(i;st+1)H(i;st)￿￿1y(i;st+1)￿
)
; (24)
where mc = @ ~ C
@y is the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of output. Note that ￿ is the
multiplier associated with equation (19).
The ￿rst two equations (22 and 23) give the optimal prices set by domestic intermediate ￿rms
at home and abroad respectively while the third equation determines the optimal accumulation of
organizational capital. The pricing equations are standard except for the second term within curly
brackets in the numerator. This term re￿ ects the fact that the ￿rm takes into account that its
pricing decision today a⁄ects organizational capital tomorrow through the e⁄ect on demand and
hence output. Equation (24) shows that the value of an additional unit of organizational capital
re￿ ects both its implied cost savings tomorrow as well as its positive e⁄ect on the future stock of
organizational capital.
For future reference it is worth noting at this stage that if learning were external to the ￿rm
then the second term in the numerator of both equations (22 and 23) would be absent from the
optimal pricing equation thereby making it look more standard. However, learning e⁄ects would
still show up in the model through the marginal cost term. In particular, with exogenous learning,
higher current output would raise organizational capital tomorrow thereby reducing the marginal
cost tomorrow. This would induce lower prices tomorrow.
14The problem for the intermediate goods ￿rms abroad leads to a symmetric set of optimality
conditions. In particular, we have
P￿
f (i;st￿1)=
P
st Q(st)y￿
f(i;st)
￿
e(st)mc￿(i;st) ￿ ￿￿￿(i;st)H￿(i;st￿1)￿y￿(i;st)￿￿1￿
￿
P
st Q(st)e(st)y￿
f(i;st)
;
Pf(i;st￿1)=
P
st Q(st)yf(i;st)
￿
e(st)mc￿(i;st) ￿ ￿￿￿(i;st)H￿(i;st￿1)￿y￿(i;st)￿￿1￿
￿
P
st Q(st)yf(i;st)
;
￿￿(i;st)=
X
st+1
Q(st+1)
(￿
"
￿ + ￿
￿
e(st) ~ C￿(i;st+1)
H￿(i;st)
+ ￿￿￿(i;st+1)H￿(i;st)￿￿1y￿(i;st+1)￿
)
:
These equations have the same intuitive explanations as the ones for the domestic ￿rm. The only
point worth noting is that since all the accounting is being done in terms of domestic currency, and
since the foreign ￿rms face their costs in foreign currency, the cost terms have to be multiplied by
e to convert them into domestic currency units.
2.4 Government
We are going to consolidate the ￿scal and monetary authorities in this environment into one en-
tity called the government. The government injects money into the economy through lump-sum
transfers. Hence,
T(st) = M(st) ￿ M(st￿1):
Moreover, we assume that the money supply process is given by
M(st) = ￿(st)M(st￿1);
where ￿(st) is a stochastic process and where M(s￿1) is given. We further assume that the foreign
government behaves symmetrically so that analogous conditions hold for them.
2.5 Equilibrium conditions
For an equilibrium in this environment some market clearing conditions need to be satis￿ed. In
particular, the ￿nal goods market has to clear in both countries. For the home country then,
c(st) + x(st) = y(st):
15A symmetric condition must hold in the foreign country.
Labor and capital market clearing at home require that (a)
R 1
0 l(i;st)di = l(st); and (b)
R 1
0 K(i;st)di = K(st￿1). The key thing to note in the condition for capital market clearing is
that the aggregate supply of physical capital in the economy at time t is determined in the previous
period based on state st￿1 while the demand for capital by ￿rms at time t re￿ ects the state st. Sym-
metric conditions hold for the foreign country. Lastly, the bond market clearing condition dictates
that total bonds in circulation in the world must be in zero net supply. Hence, B + B￿ = 0.
Two features of this economy are worth noting. First, since all the home (foreign) intermediate
goods enter symmetrically in the production function, in any symmetric equilibrium we must have
Pj(i;st) = Pj(st) = ￿ Pj(st) for all i and for j = h;f. Second, the domestic market clearing condition
combined with the consumers budget constraint and government transfers yields a standard current
account equation for the home country:
X
st+1
Q(st+1￿ ￿st)B(st+1) = B(st) + e(st)P￿
h(st￿1)y￿
h(st) ￿ Pf(st￿1)yf(st)
Since B = ￿B￿, there is only one independent current account equation. The surplus of one
country is the de￿cit of the other.
We conclude this section by de￿ning the equilibrium for the economy:
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium in this economy is a set of allocations for consumers c(st), c￿(st),
l(st), l￿(st), M(st), M￿(st), x(st); x￿(st); K(st), K￿(st), B(st), B￿(st); allocations and prices
for intermediate ￿rms yh(i;st), y￿
h(i;st), yf(i;st), y￿
f(i;st), N(i;st), N￿(i;st), K(i;st), K￿(i;st),
Ph(i;st￿1), P￿
h(i;st￿1), Pf(i;st￿1), P￿
f (i;st￿1) for all i 2 [0;1]; allocations and prices for ￿nal goods
￿rms , y(st), y￿(st), P(st), P￿(st); real input prices w(st), w￿(st), R(st), R￿(st); and bond prices
Q(st+1￿ ￿st) such that (a) consumers solve their optimization problem; (b) intermediate ￿rms solve
their pro￿t maximization problem; (c) ￿nal goods ￿rms solve their pro￿t maximization problem; (d)
all markets clear; and (e) the restrictions imposed by the government transfer policy are satis￿ed.
163 Computation method and calibration
The model is solved using the method outlined in King and Watson (2002) using a linear ap-
proximation to the system of equations outlined above. We solve for the stationary equilibrium.
Nominal variables that are growing in steady state are rendered stationary by dividing by the stock
of money in the economy.
In order to simulate the economy, functional forms have to be speci￿ed and values assigned to
a number of parameters. In order to o⁄er a consistent comparison we have chosen these to be as
close as possible to the benchmark speci￿cation in CKM (2002). Our speci￿cation of preferences
is
U
￿
c(st);l(st) ￿ bl(st￿1);
M(st)
P(st)
￿
=
1
1￿￿Z(st)1￿￿ +  
￿
l(st) ￿ bl(st￿1)
￿1￿￿ =(1 ￿ ￿): (25)
where
Z(st) =
"
!c(st)(’￿1)=’ + (1 ￿ !)
￿
M(st)
P(st)
￿(’￿1)=’# ’
’￿1
Following CKM we set ! = 0:94; ’ = 0:39: They derive these estimates by taking logs of
the ￿rst order condition for money balances and then running an OLS regression on the resulting
expression for money demand. We pick ￿ to match the volatility of the real exchange rate relative
to output in the model with the data.6   is set so that the fraction of the time endowment spent on
working in steady state is 0:3. In order to maintain consistency of preferences with balanced growth
we set ￿ = ￿. In terms of the habit persistence parameter, a number of estimates of b are available
in the literature ranging from a high of roughly 0:8 in Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988)
to a low around 0:5 in Braun and Evans (1998). Following Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton
(1988) we set b = 0:8. Lastly, as in Cooper and Johri (2002) we set the discount factor ￿ to 0:984.
The four parameters appearing in the ￿nal goods technology are ￿;￿; a1and a2: The parameter
￿ governs the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. ￿ = 1=3 implies an
elasticity of 1:5 which is the number used by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994). We set a1 = 0:94
and a2 = 0:06. These numbers, from CKM (2002), were chosen to set the steady state share of
6We report the sensitivity of our results to ￿ below in our robustness checks.
17imports in total US GDP to 1:6 percent (which is the share of US imports from Europe in the
data). Note that in a symmetric steady state yh=yf = (a1=a2)
1
1￿￿.
For the parameters governing learning (";￿ and ￿), we build on the vast number of empirical
studies of learning-by-doing summarized in Irwin and Klenow (1994). There are a variety of
available estimates on learning which vary from 20 percent learning (a doubling of production
experience leads to a 20 percent fall in costs, often referred to as the "20 percent rule") to 39
percent learning estimated by Benkard (2000). These roughly correspond to " = :27 and " =
:48 respectively. We choose " = 0:4; a number in the middle of this range, corresponding to 31
percent learning. These studies assume that current production contributes fully to the stock of
organizational capital. Following the literature we retain a value of ￿ = 1: We set ￿ = 0:5 as
estimated by Cooper and Johri (2002).
The steady state capital output ratio is a function of the technological parameters as well as
￿;￿ and ￿: We set the labor and capital share parameters to conventional levels: ￿ = 0:6 and
￿ = 0:4: The depreciation rate, ￿ = 0:021, was borrowed from CKM. We choose ￿ (which governs
the elasticity of substitution between domestic intermediate goods) to maintain the steady state
capital output ratio at 10:2. This is a quarterly number which converts to an annual capital output
ratio of 2:1.7 The adjustment cost parameter is varied across speci￿cations to keep the ratio of
the standard deviation of investment to output at the value found in the US data. Table 1 lists
all our parameter values for the baseline calibration of the model.
For the money supply process, we again follow CKM and postulate the following processes for
home and abroad:
log￿t =￿￿ log￿t￿1 + "￿t (26)
log￿￿
t =￿￿ log￿￿
t￿1 + "￿
￿t
7In the standard model the mark-up of price over marginal cost is given by 1=￿. Hence, the typical approach is
to set ￿ = 0:9 since this produces a price mark-up of 10 percent. In our model, the mark-up isn￿ t a constant since
it also depends on the learning e⁄ects. We should point out that the steady state mark-up induced by our baseline
parameterization is 5 percent.
18where "￿t distributed as N
￿
0;￿2
￿
￿
. The shocks are positively cross-correlated. CKM estimate ￿￿
by running this regression on US data for M1 from 1959:2 to 2001:1. We use their estimate for ￿￿
and set it to 0:68. The correlation between shocks in the two countries was chosen to match the
cross-country correlation of output, as in CKM (2002).
4 Results
The main goal of this section is to evaluate the quantitative performance of this model. We are
especially interested in the real exchange rate dynamics generated by the model. We will focus
on the same two moments emphasized in the literature: the ￿rst order autocorrelation of the real
exchange rate (￿q) and it￿ s standard deviation relative to output (￿q=y) where all variables are
measured as percent deviations from their steady state values. The behaviour of hours, investment
and consumption is an important part of our story so we will discuss the volatility of these as well
relative to the volatility of output.
Table 2 summarizes our main results. All data (in logs) are linearly detrended before computing
the reported statistics. Row 1 reports the relevant statistics for the US economy. Columns 2-
6 of Table 2 present the volatility of consumption, investment, hours, real exchange rate, and
nominal exchange rate relative to the volatility of output. Columns 7 and 8 report the ￿rst order
autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the nominal and real exchange rates for various models and the US
economy relative to a European aggregate. The last column reports the cross-correlation between
nominal and real exchange rates. We use the notation ￿i=j to denote the standard deviation of
variable i relative to the standard deviation of variable j. ￿i;j denotes the correlation between i
and j.
In the data the real and nominal exchange rates are highly positively correlated, very persistent
and highly volatile. Row 1 shows that the real exchange rate between US and Europe is roughly
￿ve times as volatile as US aggregate output while the nominal exchange rate is six times as volatile.
Moreover, both the nominal and real exchange rates have a ￿rst order autocorrelation coe¢ cient
larger than 0:9.
19Our model reduces to the standard model used in the literature with one-period pre-set prices
when we shut down both the learning-by-doing (LBD) and habit persistence e⁄ects. We refer to
this as the benchmark model. Row 2 of Table 2 reports the statistics generated by this benchmark
model. The benchmark model with prices pre-set for one period is able to deliver approximately
the same amount of relative volatility as the data (the underlying relative risk aversion parameter
is 11). However, not surprisingly, it fails to deliver any persistence in the real exchange rate.
The autocorrelation coe¢ cient of q is negative and close to zero! The nominal exchange rate, e,
inherits roughly the same persistence that is built into the money shock process. The benchmark
model also displays too high a volatility of aggregate hours relative to output and too low a relative
volatility of consumption.
The third row of Table 2 reports the statistics generated by the full model including both LBD
and habits. Clearly, the model ￿ts the data signi￿cantly better than the benchmark model. While
most of the other statistics are comparable, our baseline model does much better in terms of the
persistence of the real exchange rate. The ￿rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the real exchange
rate is 0:8 which is a major improvement relative to ￿0:01 in the benchmark model. Moreover,
the relative volatility of the real exchange rate continues to be very close to the data for the same
relative risk aversion parameter ￿ = 11 . This isn￿ t a surprise since in the complete markets case
the variance of the real exchange rate is proportional to the intertemporal risk aversion parameter.
Hence, as shown by CKM (2002), one can always increase the intertemporal risk aversion parameter
su¢ ciently in order to reproduce the real exchange rate volatility in the data.
Row four reproduces moments using CKM￿ s benchmark speci￿cation with prices preset for four
quarters but absent our mechanisms.8 Even with long periods of sticky prices, the model generates
real exchange rates that are somewhat less persistent and less volatile than those reported in row
three. The relative volatilities of consumption and investment di⁄er from other rows of Table 2 due
to di⁄erent calibration strategies which are discussed below. As we show in our sensitivity analysis,
this leads to only small changes in exchange rate behaviour.
8Note that the moments are based on linear detrending to be compatible with the rest of the table.
20Clearly the model including both LBD and habits does quite well in generating a quantitatively
signi￿cant amount of persistence in the real exchange rate though a little less than seen in the
data. But what is the contribution of each margin? Rows 5 and 6 of Table 1 answer this question.
The results show that both learning-by-doing (LBD) and habits on their own improve upon the
benchmark model. Once again both models are calibrated to deliver the same relative volatility
of investment as seen in the data. Moreover, the risk aversion parameter, ￿; is chosen to deliver
roughly the same relative volatility of real and nominal exchange rates as before. As a result the
two models look quite similar on these dimensions. However, the implications of the two models
are starkly di⁄erent when one considers the persistence of q. Compared to a value of ￿0:01 in the
benchmark model, the model with only LBD delivers an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0:48 while
the model with only habits delivers a coe¢ cient of 0:45. Hence, both margins signi￿cantly increase
the degree of persistence of the real exchange rate.
A key feature of our model is that learning is internal to the ￿rm. Hence, the ￿rm takes
learning into account while making its pricing decisions. This is precisely the feature that makes
the pricing decision of the ￿rm dynamic. However, if learning were exogenous to the ￿rm but
continued to follow an evolution process given by equation (19), there would still be a propagation
mechanism built into the model through the evolution of H. Speci￿cally, if output increased in
any period then it would set in motion an increase in organizational capital H which would, in
turn, increase output directly and indirectly through the transition mechanism of equation (19).
Thus, a question of interest is how much of the persistence of q is being driven by this exogenous
transmission mechanism and how much more is coming from the endogenous pricing decision of
the ￿rm?
The last row of Table 2 reports the statistics for the model with both learning and habits but
where learning is exogenous to the ￿rm. ￿q falls to 0:73 in this case. This number, while smaller,
is still fairly close to the ￿q = 0:8 that we get in our baseline model where learning is endogeneized
by the ￿rm. Hence, we conclude that our results are not very sensitive to whether learning is
internal or external to the ￿rm. What is key is that there is an endogenous mechanism in the
21model which can propagate shocks through a real channel with the dominant factor being the fall
in future marginal cost due to higher output today.9
We next turn to studying the sensitivity of the results for our baseline model with both LBD
and habits. Table 3 reports results when we change parameters in our baseline model with both
LBD and habits. There are four key parameters of interest in the sense that results are sensitive
to them. In Table 3 below we report them in turn. The ￿rst margin of interest is the e⁄ect of
learning. In particular, we have assumed moderate degrees of learning e⁄ects. For our baseline
case we assumed " = 0:4 which translates to 32 percent learning, i.e., a doubling of production
experience reduces costs by 32 percent. In the empirical literature, estimated learning e⁄ects
range from 20 percent (see Irwin and Klenow (1994) to 39 percent (see Benkard (2000)). What
is the e⁄ect of weaker learning e⁄ects? The row ￿Low LBD￿reports results when we lower " to
0:264 which implies 20 percent learning. Note that we keep all other parameters unchanged relative
to the baseline model except ￿;  and ￿ which are altered appropriately to target the volatility of
investment, the steady state proportion of work time, and the steady state capital-output ratio.
As Table 3 makes clear, the primary e⁄ects of lower learning are on the persistence of the real
exchange rate. In particular, the persistence of the real exchange rate declines to 0:67 from 0:8
in the baseline case. We interpret this result as being suggestive of the quantitative importance
of learning e⁄ects in understanding the persistence of real variables like the real exchange rate at
business cycle frequencies.
The next parameter of interest is b which is the intensity of habits in leisure. Recall that we
had assumed b = 0:8 which was at the high end of available estimates for b. In the row labeled
￿LBD plus Low Habits" we report results from our baseline model with b = 0:5 holding all other
parameters except ￿ and   constant. Row 7 of Table 3 shows that less intensive habit formation
in leisure induce less persistence in the real exchange rate which falls to 0:65.
9We should note that our model doesn￿ t allow for entry of new ￿rms. If some of the higher demand generated
by a surprise money injection were met through entry of new ￿rms the learning e⁄ect would get muted. This then
would reduce the degree of persistence generated by the model.
22A third parameter that is crucial for our results is the degree of home bias. In the model the
degree of home bias is controlled by the parameter a1 which is the coe¢ cient on home intermediate
goods in the ￿nal goods technology. In the baseline case we had set a1 = 0:94 to re￿ ect the high
home bias in the US data as measured by the share of imports in GDP. To study the importance
of home bias, the last row of Table 3 reports results for the case a1 = 0:5. This is the symmetric
case in which there is no home bias at all. The results make clear that in the absence of home
bias there would be no persistence whatsoever in this model despite the presence of endogenous
persistence mechanisms in the form of LBD and habits. In e⁄ect, the results under the symmetric
case look like the benchmark model in terms of the behavior of the real exchange rate. Intuitively,
an unanticipated increase in money supply causes an increase in domestic demand on impact due
to preset prices. If this increased demand induces an equal increase in demand for home and
foreign intermediates then the production side responds symmetrically in both countries. This
implies that the learning and habit e⁄ects are symmetric as well which causes the pricing behavior
of domestic and foreign ￿rms to be identical. Thus, the domestic and foreign price levels respond
symmetrically which, in turn, causes the real exchange rate to revert to its long run equilibrium
level in the ￿rst period that prices are free to adjust. Note that even though the behavior of the
real exchange rate is markedly di⁄erent from the baseline case, the other moments of the model
remain very similar to the baseline case.
A last parameter of interest is the coe¢ cient of risk aversion parameter ￿. We use ￿ = 11 in
order to generate ￿q=Y approximately consistent with the data. Contrastingly, CKM used ￿ = 5.
The di⁄erence between these two numbers is purely due to the di⁄erent calibration strategies. We
calibrated the adjustment cost parameter ￿ to target the relative volatility of investment. CKM,
on the other hand, picked ￿ to target the relative volatility of consumption. Our calibration choice
implies that the volatility of consumption is too low (relative to output). Hence, the required ￿ is
higher than in CKM. This trade-o⁄ between the relative volatility of investment and consumption
is evident when comparing rows three and four in Table 2 where we reported moments for CKM.
In order to check the sensitivity of our results to this parameter, we followed the CKM strategy
23and set ￿ = 5 and raised ￿ enough to match the relative volatility of consumption. The last row of
Table 3 reports the results under this alternative parameterization. Relative to our baseline model,
this change has a very marginal e⁄ect on the persistence of the real exchange rate with ￿q falling
to 0:76 from 0:8 in the baseline case. The volatility of the real exchange rate declines more as ￿q=Y
falls to 4:13 from 5:67 in the baseline case. These numbers are roughly consistent with CKM￿ s four
quarter price stickiness case reported in Table 2. However, despite this, the generated relative real
exchange rate volatility is still about 75 percent of the relative volatility in the data (5:5). Clearly,
the model (as indeed the CKM model as well) cannot simultaneously match the relative volatilities
of both consumption and investment since now the investment volatility generated by the model is
too low relative to the data. Overall, we interpret these results as suggesting that our main ￿ndings
on persistence and volatility are robust to alternative parameterizations of ￿.
Given our modeling choices, in particular, the endogenous productivity margin implied by the
LBD channel, and the exogenous price rigidity implied by one-period preset prices, we need to
address two additional implications of the model. First, the learning mechanism formalized here
implies that productivity evolves endogenously in the model. Given that we have calibrated the
money shock process so that the output movements in model replicate the data, a logical question is
what are the properties of the Solow residuals generated by the model and how do they compare with
the Solow residuals measured in the data? The model performs fairly well along this dimension.
The standard deviation of the Solow residual relative to output in the model is 0:72 while the ￿rst
order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the Solow residual is 0:96. Since both these numbers are close
to those reported in the data, we conclude that the model is generating sensible paths for capital
and hours.
Second, while our model has highlighted an environment with minimal price rigidity (one quar-
ter), a key criticism of models with exogenous price rigidity and local currency pricing (LCP) is
that these models predict that the correlation between the nominal exchange rate and the terms of
trade (de￿ned as the ratio of import to export prices) should be negative, i.e., when the currency
depreciates, the terms of trade facing the country should improve. Pointing this out, Obstfeld
24and Rogo⁄ (2000) showed evidence that the contemporaneous correlation between changes in the
exchange rate and changes in the terms of trade was positive for most countries in their sample.
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄concluded from their work that models with hard-wired price rigidity and LCP
like CKM (2002) were problematic. While our model has both one period pre-set prices and LCP
built into them, we do have other mechanisms in the model (LBD and habits) which induce en-
dogenous sluggish price adjustment. Hence, the model might be able to escape the Obstfeld-Rogo⁄
criticism. Indeed, the contemporaneous correlation between innovations in the nominal exchange
rate and the terms of trade is positive (0:24).
The key to this result is the learning mechanism. Consider a positive shock to the rate of
growth of money supply at home. The nominal exchange rate depreciates on impact but the terms
of trade (pf=ep￿
h) falls since pf and p￿
h are both ￿xed. Hence, the impact e⁄ect goes exactly as in
the Obstfeld-Rogo⁄ criticism. However, next period the nominal exchange rate depreciates some
more as the rate of growth of money remains high. On the other hand, the higher production in
the impact period implies that both domestic and foreign intermediate goods producers ￿nd their
productivities to be higher next period. This reduces both their marginal costs. Hence, they
both raise their prices by less than the full proportion of the shock. However, this productivity
e⁄ect is much stronger for the home producer than for the foreign producer. Since the money
shock increases the demand for ￿nal goods at home, the home bias in the production technology
for intermediate goods implies that the demand for home intermediate goods rises more than the
demand for foreign goods. Hence, the learning e⁄ect on organizational capital is higher at home
than abroad. This induces the domestic intermediate producer to raise prices less than the foreign
supplier. This di⁄erential e⁄ect induces the terms of trade to deteriorate over time as the nominal
exchange rate depreciates.
5 Conclusions
Traditional explanations for the high volatility and persistence of real exchange rates in the data
have been based on monetary shocks and nominal price rigidities. However, recent work on
25standard dynamic general equilibrium models with sticky prices has shown that this traditional
explanation requires prices to be rigid for upwards of four quarters (see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2002)). This appears to be too high relative to the data (e.g., Bils and Klenow (2004)). In this
paper we have augmented the standard model with learning-by-doing at the level of the ￿rm and
habit formation in leisure. These two margins introduce an endogenous propagation mechanism
into the standard model. As a result, even with one period pre-set prices, a monetary expansion has
long-lived e⁄ects. The increase in production in the period of the shock causes learning which raises
future productivity and output. Hence, ￿rms raise prices by less than the full proportion of the
money shock in the following period since the marginal cost of production is low and thus produce
more than the long run equilibrium level. This channel is complemented by habits in leisure which
induce labor supply to adjust gradually. As a result, the dynamics of output and the real exchange
rate both show persistent deviations from steady state. Under our baseline calibration, the model
generates a ￿rst-order autoregression coe¢ cient of 0:8 and a standard deviation (relative to output)
of 5:6 for the real exchange rate even though prices are ￿xed for only one quarter and monetary
shocks are the only source of variability. We view these results as both providing an explanation
for real exchange rate behavior as well as being supportive of the basic mechanism formalized in
the paper.
More generally, the mechanism formalized in the model introduces an endogenous propagation
channel which can transmit and propagate disturbances in real variables over time. Hence, even
though in this paper we have studied business cycle dynamics that are driven by monetary shocks
alone, we believe that the model would work well in alternative environments where business cycle
dynamics are driven by either technology shocks or both technology shocks and monetary shocks.
Moreover, since prices are pre-set for just one quarter, the model relies essentially on its internal real
transmission mechanism to generate persistence rather than exogenous price stickiness. Hence, we
believe that the quantitative results will go through under richer or more realistic monetary policy
rules like the Taylor rule rather than the simple money growth process that we have studied here
since the sole role of a monetary shock here is to cause an initial disturbance in output.
26We have chosen to ignore some important and relevant margins in this paper. Thus, we have
assumed that producers price to market (PTM) and price their goods in terms of the currency
of the buyer (local currency pricing). We do not explain why producers choose to behave this
way. Interesting work on this topic can be found in Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) and
Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2006) who study the role of distribution costs and non-traded goods
in understanding the behavior of real exchange rates.
Another issue relates to the model￿ s predicted pricing behavior at the ￿rm level. In particular,
under the environment of the model, the representative ￿rm changes prices relatively smoothly and
in every period in response to a monetary shock. This is at odds with the available evidence on
￿rm-level pricing behavior which suggests that ￿rms adjust prices infrequently and when they do
they adjust prices discretely. As an illustration, Golosov and Lucas (2007) say that conditional
on changing prices, on average, ￿rms increase them by 9.5 %. However, it is not clear if these
changes are driven solely by changes to monetary policy. Thus, Golosov and Lucas try to match
the ￿rm-level facts by building a model with both idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate monetary
shocks. If the observed large changes in prices at the ￿rm level are driven by large idiosyncratic
shocks, then an appropriately modi￿ed version of our model to include ￿rm level shocks may be
able to account for it. However, given that the goal of the model is to explain aggregate responses
to monetary shocks rather than individual price data, this kind of extension would take us well
beyond the scope of the paper. As is often the case when comparing micro and aggregate data,
individual price changes display a lot of lumpiness, but adjustments in the aggregate price level are
quite smooth. Our model delivers this feature.
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30Table 1. Parameters for baseline calibration
Parameter Value Comment
! 0:94 Preference parameter
’ 0:39 Preference parameter
  Calibrated Preference parameter
￿ 11 Intertemporal risk aversion parameter
￿ ￿ Controls elasticity of labor supply
b 0:8 Habit intensity
￿ 0:984 Discount factor
￿ 1=3 Controls the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
￿ Calibrated Controls elasticity of substitution between home goods
a1 0:94 Home goods production share parameter
a2 0:06 Foreign goods production share parameter
￿ 0:6 Labor share of output
￿ 0:4 Capital share of output
￿ 0:021 Depreciation rate
￿ Calibrated Adjustment cost parameter
￿ 0:5 Coe¢ cient on Ht in learning function
￿ 1 Coe¢ cient on Yt in learning function
" 0:4 Output share of organizational capital
31Table 2: Properties of the Models
￿C=Y ￿I=Y ￿N=Y ￿q=Y ￿e=Y ￿q ￿e ￿q;e
US Data 0.95 2.66 0.78 5.50 6.29 0.94 0.95 0.99
Benchmark 0.55 2.66 1.65 5.65 7.48 -0.01 0.66 0.92
LBD + Habits 0.55 2.66 1.22 5.67 5.11 0.8 0.76 0.97
CKM 4 quarters 0.83 1.58 2.44 4.24 6.93 0.71 0.89 0.49
LBD only 0.56 2.66 1.45 5.18 6.20 0.48 0.73 0.92
Habits only .55 2.66 1.66 5.35 6.40 .45 .67 0.97
Exog. LBD+Habits 0.55 2.66 1.30 5.64 5.48 0.73 0.72 0.97
32Table 3: Sensitivity of Results
￿C=Y ￿I=Y ￿N=Y ￿q=Y ￿e=Y ￿q ￿e ￿q;e
US Data 0.95 2.66 0.78 5.50 6.29 0.94 0.95 0.99
LBD + Habits 0.55 2.66 1.22 5.67 5.11 0.8 0.76 0.97
Low LBD + Habits 0.55 2.66 1.33 5.53 5.72 0.67 0.71 0.99
LBD + Low Habits 0.55 2.66 1.33 5.36 5.81 0.65 0.74 0.98
No Home Bias 0.55 2.66 1.18 5.27 6.96 0 0.65 0.76
￿ = 5 0.95 1.22 1.16 4.13 3.78 0.76 0.72 0.98
33